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Abstract. Dependability is an umbrella concept that subsumes many
key properties about a system, including reliability, maintainability, safety,
availability, confidentiality, and integrity. Various dependability model-
ing techniques have been developed to effectively capture the failure
characteristics of systems over time. Traditionally, dependability mod-
els are analyzed using paper-and-pencil proof methods and computer
based simulation tools but their results cannot be trusted due to their
inherent inaccuracy limitations. The recent developments in probabilis-
tic analysis support using formal methods have enabled the possibility of
accurate and rigorous dependability analysis. Thus, the usage of formal
methods for dependability analysis is widely advocated for safety-critical
domains, such as transportation, aerospace and health. Given the com-
plementary strengths of mainstream formal methods, like theorem prov-
ing and model checking, and the variety of dependability models judging
the most suitable formal technique for a given dependability model is
not a straightforward task. In this paper, we present a comprehensive
review of existing formal dependability analysis techniques along with
their pros and cons for handling a particular dependability model.
Keywords: Reliability Block Diagrams, Fault Tree, Markov Chain, Petri
Nets, Model Checking, Higher-order Logic, Theorem Proving.
1 Introduction
The rapid advancement in technology in the past few decades has enabled us
to develop many sophisticated systems that range from ubiquitous hand-held
devices (like cell phones and tablets) to high-end computing equipment used in
aircrafts, power systems, nuclear plants and healthcare devices. Ensuring the
reliable functioning of these sophisticated systems is a major concern for design
engineers. This concern is greatly amplified for safety-critical systems where a
slight malfunction in the system may endanger human lives or lead to heavy
financial set-backs. In order to avoid such scenarios beforehand, several depend-
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ability modeling techniques have been developed that can effectively model the
failure characteristics of a system and thus analyze its failure behavior.
Dependability is primarily defined as the ability of a system to deliver service
that can justifiably be trusted [1]. Dependability is an umbrella concept which is
evolved from reliability and availability considerations [1]. Many authors describe
dependability of a system as a set attributes, such as reliability, maintainability,
safety, availability, confidentiality, and integrity [2]. Some of these attributes,
i.e. reliability and availability, are quantitative whereas some are qualitative, for
instance, safety [1].
Reliability is defined as the probability of a system or a sub-component func-
tioning correctly under certain conditions over a specified interval of time [1].
Availability is a closely related concept to reliability and it can be defined as the
probability that a component will be available when demanded [1]. To under-
stand the difference between reliability and availability, it is important to realize
that reliability refers to failure-free operation during an interval, while availabil-
ity refers to failure-free operation at a given instant of time [1]. Availability can
be viewed as a special case of reliability and is thus commonly considered as an
attribute of reliability [3]. The availability of a system is typically measured as
a function of reliability and maintainability, which is defined as the the prob-
ability of performing a successful repair action of a system under a given time
and stated conditions [1]. Additionally, if we keep the maintainability measure
constant, the availability of the system is directly proportional to the reliabil-
ity of the system [4]. This paper mainly focuses on reliability and availability
attributes of dependability, since maintainability can be considered as a part of
availability.
The first step in conducting the dependability analysis is the calculation of
basic metrics of reliability and availability, such as mean-time to failure (MTTF)
[1], mean-time between failure (MTBF) [1] and mean-time to repair (MTTR)
[1], at the individual component level of the given system. The next step is
the selection of an appropriate dependability modeling technique. Some of the
widely used dependability modeling techniques include Reliability Block Dia-
grams (RBD) [5], Fault Trees (FT) [6] and Markov chains (MC) [7]. The selec-
tion among these modeling techniques depends upon numerous factors, which
include the level of available details, size and complexity of the given commu-
nication network system. These modeling techniques allow us to estimate the
reliability and availability of the system at the system level and play a par-
ticularly useful role at the design stage of a system for scrutinizing the design
alternatives without building the actual system. Once the modeling technique
is selected, the third and the last step is the choice of the appropriate system
level reliability and availability analysis technique. The dependability models,
formed using these techniques, are analyzed using paper-and-pencil based ana-
lytical methods or simulation. However, these analysis methods cannot ascertain
absolute correctness of the analysis mainly because of the human error and man-
ual manipulations involved in the former and the sampling based deduction and
the usage of pseudo random numbers and computer arithmetic in the later. For-
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mal methods, on the other hand, use mathematical logic to precisely model the
system’s intended behavior and deploy mathematical reasoning to construct an
irrefutable proof that the given system satisfies its requirements. This kind of
mathematical modeling and analysis makes formal methods an accurate and
rigorous analysis method compared to the traditional analytical and simulation
based analysis. Thus, they are being strongly advocated for being used for the
dependability analysis of safety-critical systems.
The purpose of this survey paper is to provide a generic overview of the formal
methods that are being utilized for dependability analysis. These formal methods
primarily include: (i) Petri Nets (ii) Model Checking and (iii) Higher-order Logic
theorem proving as they have all been used for the dependability analysis using
the three dependability modeling techniques: RBD, FT, and MC. The main focus
of the paper is to study the utilization of formal methods in conjunction with
the dependability modeling techniques for real-world applications and thus gain
insights about the strengths and weaknesses of these formal methods and how
to use them in the most effective manner. It is important to note that the paper
is unique compared to existing surveys and tutorials on dependability analysis
[8,9,10,3] due to its exclusive focus on dependability modeling techniques and
their analysis with formal methods. For instnace, in [8] a unified framework for
reliability with Markov reward models is described and then a survey of existing
reliability analysis software tools is presented. Similarly, a survey of work related
to dependability modeling and analysis of software and systems specified with
UML is presented in [9]. In [10] and [3], tools and methods that have been
used for enhancing the dependability of Wireless Sensor networks (WSN) and
communication networks are also surveyed, respectively. Unlike above work, this
paper discusses about the pros and cons of modeling techniques and formal
methods for the dependability analysis of a broad range of systems.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly describes com-
monly used dependability modeling techniques. Section 3 presents a detailed sur-
vey of formal methods that have been used for conducting accurate and rigorous
dependability analysis of real-world systems. Section 4 provides the insights and
the common pitfalls of the dependability modeling techniques and also a com-
parison of formal methods with traditional dependability analysis techniques.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Dependability Modeling Techniques
Dependability assessment techniques can be utilized in every design phase of the
system or component including development, operation and maintenance. FT
and RBD based models are usually used to provide reliability and availability
estimates for both early and later stages of the design, where the system models
are more refined and have more detailed specifications compared to the early
stage system models [1]. While on the other hand, MC based models are mainly
used in the later design phase to perform trade-off analysis among different de-
sign alternatives when the detailed specification of the design becomes available.
In addition, when the system is deployed, these modeling techniques can be ben-
eficial in order to estimate the frequency of maintenance and part replacement
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in the design, which allows us to determine the life cost of the system elements
or components. In this section, we present a brief detail about some commonly
used dependability modeling techniques to facilitate the understanding of the
next sections.
2.1 Reliability Block Diagrams
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) [11] are graphical structures consisting of
blocks and connector lines. The blocks usually represent the system components
and the connection of these components is described by the connector lines. The
system is functional, if at least one path of properly functional components from
input to output exists otherwise it fails.
Table 1: RBDs with their Mathematical Expressions
RBDs Mathematical Expressions
1 N OI Rseries(t) = Pr(
N⋂
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i=1
Ri(t)
1
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k
)
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An RBD construction can follow any one of three basic patterns of compo-
nent connections: (i) series (ii) active redundancy or (iii) standby redundancy. In
the series connection, shown in Table 1, all components should be functional for
the system to remain functional. The corresponding reliability expression is also
shown in Table 1, where Ai represents the event corresponding to i
th compo-
nent. In an active redundancy, all components in at least one of the redundant
stages must be functioning in fully operational mode. The components in an
active redundancy might be connected in a parallel structure or a combination
of series and parallel structures as shown in Table 1. In a standby redundancy,
all components are not required to be active. In other words, at least k out of n
are required by the system to be functional, which can be seen in Table 1. There
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Table 2: Probability of Failure of Fault Tree Gates
FT Gates Failure Probability Expressions
F (t) = Pr(
N⋂
i=2
Ai(t)) =
N∏
i=2
Fi(t)
F (t) = Pr(
N⋃
i=2
Ai(t)) = 1−
N∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t))
F (t) = 1− FOR(t) =
N∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t))
F (t)= Pr(
k⋂
i=2
Ai(t) ∩
N⋂
j=k
Ai(t))=
k∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t)) ∗
N∏
j=k
(Fj(t))
F (t)= Pr(A¯(t)B(t) ∪ A(t)B¯(t))= FA(t)(1− FB(t)) + FB(t)(1− FA(t))
F (t) = Pr(A¯(t)) = (1− FA(t))
are three main requirements for building the RBD of a given system, i.e., the
information about the (i) functional interaction of the system components; (ii)
reliability of each component usually expressed in terms of failure distributions,
such as exponential or Weibull, having appropriate failure rates; and (iii) mis-
sion times at which the reliability is desired. This information is then utilized
by the design engineers to identify the appropriate RBD configuration (series,
parallel or series-parallel) in order to determine the overall reliability of the given
system. The detail about these commonly used RBD configurations and their
corresponding mathematical expressions are presented in Table 1.
2.2 Fault Trees
Fault Tree (FT ) [6] is a graphical technique for analyzing the conditions and
the factors causing an undesired top event, i.e., a critical event, which can cause
the whole system failure upon its occurrence. These causes of system failure are
represented in the form of a tree rooted by the top event. The preceding nodes
of the fault tree are represented by gates, which are used to link two or more
cause events causing one fault in a prescribed manner. For example, an OR FT
gate can be used when one fault suffices to enforce the fault. On the other hand,
the AND FT gate is used when all the cause events are essential for enforcing
the fault. Besides these gates, there are some other gates, such as exclusive OR
FT gate, priority FT gate and inhibit FT gate, which can be used to model the
occurrence of faults due to the corresponding cause events [6].
Once the fault tree model is constructed, both qualitative and quantitative
analysis can be carried out. A qualitative analysis in this context allows the
identification of all combinations of basic failure events, known as cut sets, which
can cause the top event to occur. The minimal cut sets (MCS) are those cut
sets that do not contain any subset of the basic cause events that are still a cut
set and are obtained by applying Boolean algebraic operations on these cut sets.
The smaller the number of basic cause events in these cut set, the more resilient
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to failures is the considered modeled system. The quantitative analysis is used
to evaluate the probability of occurrence of the top event by considering these
minimal cut sets, which significantly contribute to the system failures.
In Fault Tree analysis (FTA), each FT gate has an associated failure probabil-
ity expression as shown in Table 2. These expressions can be utilized to evaluate
the reliability of the system. The first step in the FTA is the construction of the
FT of the given system. This is followed by the assignment of the failure dis-
tributions to basic cause-events and the identification of the Minimal Cut Set
(MCS) failure events, which contribute in the occurrence of the top event. These
MCS failure events are generally modeled in terms of the exponential or Weibull
random variables and the Probabilistic Inclusion-Exclusion (PIE) principle [11]
is then used to evaluate the probability of failure of the given system.
2.3 Markov Chain
A MC [12] is a stochastic process that consists of a set of states, i.e., S =
{s0, s1, ..., sn}, and arcs, which are used to point the transition from one state
to another. The initial state sini and the probability pij represent the starting
state and the transition probability from state si to state sj , respectively. The
process starts from an initial state and transitions from the current state to
the next state occur on the basis of transition probabilities, which only depend
upon the current state based on the Markov or the memoryless property. Markov
chains are usually classified into two categories: Discrete Time Markov Chains
(DTMC) and Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC). Markovian models
are frequently utilized for reliability analysis in scenarios where failure or repair
events can occur at any point in time [12].
Markov modeling has also been utilized for analyzing the dynamic behavior of
the other reliability models, i.e., RBD and FT. The notion of dynamic behavior,
for reliability analysis, represents the evolution of system topology/configuration
with respect to time. In the case of Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams (DRBD)
[13], the system is modeled in terms of states of the components and the evolution
of these components states is carried out by a sequence of events [13]. A typical
DRBD contains the following states: (i) Active: the state of proper functioning of
the component; (ii) Failed : the failure state of the component; and (iii) Standby :
the state depicting the case when the component is not in functional or in active
condition but it can be activated. In addition, there are other states such as Hot,
Warm and Cold, representing the conditions when the system or component is
disabled but energized, partially and completely disabled, respectively [13].
3 Formal Dependability Analysis Techniques
3.1 Petri Nets
A Petri Net (PN) [14] is a bipartite directed graph consisting of disjoint sets of
places P and transitions T . The former, which is represented by circles, models
the condition while the latter, signified by bars, represents the events or activities
that may occur in the system. The directed arcs (P×T ) and (T×P ), represented
by arrows, describe the input places P for the transitions T and output places
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P for the transitions T , respectively. Places may be empty or contain more than
one token that is drawn by a block dot and term marking represents the tokens
over the set of places. A transition is said to be enabled, in a given marking, if all
its input places contain at least one token. An enabled transition can be fired
and as a result a token will be removed from the input places of the transition
and added to its output places.
Petri Nets and its variants are widely used as a reliability analysis tool for
many real-world systems due to their ability to efficiently handle large problems
of dynamic nature. For instance, PNs have been used for the reliability assess-
ment of Web services [15] and a wind turbine hydraulic variable pitch system [16].
Many existing work have utilized the PNs for availability analysis, for instance,
the availability of a mechanical system is hierarchically analyzed by dividing the
complete system into three levels [17]. A system level PN model is constructed
by composing the PNs of the subsystem levels, which are also composed from
the PNs of the component level. Similarly, PNs have been used to analyze the
availability of computational servers that are processing the jobs in a queue [18],
a replicated file system to reduce the overhead in a distributed environment
[19], a subsea blowout preventer (BOP), which is essentially required to provide
safety for drilling workers, rigs and natural environment [20] and the C160 se-
ries equipment that can modify its own modules based on different process plan
and forms a new configuration [21]. In addition, a considerable amount of work
has been done by utilizing PN in conjunction with the dependability modeling
techniques, described in Section 2, for dependability analysis as follows:
Reliability Block Diagrams Many PN variants are extensively utilized to
represent the RBDs to model the reliability of communication systems with
dynamic nature. For instance, the live migration process in cloud computing
networks makes the system dynamic and thus yields to a complex RBD model,
which can be effectively handled using Petri Nets with the support of commer-
cial tools, such as SNOOPY [22] and CPN [23]. Given the dynamic nature of
visualization, due to the presence of hardware systems, software systems, live mi-
gration techniques, resource allocation algorithms and concurrent failures, virtu-
alized networks are frequently modeled with RBDs, which are then transformed
to Petri Nets for the reliability analysis [24]. The reliability of communication
networks with redundancy mechanisms has also been efficiently analysed using
RBD based Petri Nets [25].
PNs have also been used to ensure the security/safety aspects of networks
in terms of reliability and availability by analyzing the safety/security aspects
of network protocols, such as internet voting systems [26] and high-speed trains
[27]. In addition to the communication network, PNs have been used to develop
the RBDs to analyze the reliability of a logistic supply chain [28] and redundant
electrical generator used to power-up the coast guard vessel [29]. Similarly, a
Cojoint system model consisting of CPN and RBD has been effectively used to
analyze the dependability and logistics of a fault-redundant space station [30].
Fault Trees The PN approach has also been utilized, in conjunction with FTs,
for the reliability analysis of embedded systems by translating the PN reacha-
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bility into provability of linear logic sequents, which empowers the analysis by
utilizing sequent calculus [31]. The dynamic behavior of networks components,
such as timed behavioral nature, cannot be captured by simple FT models but
PNs provide a very feasible alternative for this purpose. The system under con-
sideration is modeled with a FT, which is then transformed into its corresponding
PN based model for analysis. For example, the reliability of the broadband in-
tegrated service network (B-ISDN) has been assessed by modeling the dynamic
re-routing mechanism of the traffic using the FT-based PN approach [32].
Markov Chains A considerable amount of work has been done on analyzing
reliability of systems using PNs with Markov chains. Some other prominent
work in this direction include the reliability analysis of a preemptive M/D/1/2/2
client-server queuing system [33], the dynamic reconfiguration of FPGA [34],
the data communication systems of the WLAN based train control system [35],
cellular networks [36] and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [37]. Moreover, some
network protocols, like the courier [38] and Fibre Distributed Data Interface
(FDDI) token ring protocol [39], have also been analyzed using the Petri Net
approach. Similarly, the reliability of a file server system [40], financial system
[41], distributed memories [42] and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite has also
been analyzed using PNs based on Markov chains [43]. Moreover, a Markov
regenerative PN has been introduced in [44] to extend the capability of stochastic
PN analysis and then its effectiveness is illustrated by utilizing this approach to
approximate client-server systems.
3.2 Model Checking
Model Checking [45] allows to describe the behavior of a given system in the
form of a state machine and verify its temporal properties in a rigorous manner.
Probabilistic model checking extends traditional model checking principles for
the analysis of MCs and allows the verification of probabilistic properties. Some
notable probabilistic model checking include PRISM [46] and ETMCC [47].
Probabilistic model checking techniques have been considerably adopted to
verify the reliability and availability properties of many systems, for instance,
the PRISM has been used to assess the reliability of e-health systems used in
hospitals based on the Fast Health Interoperable Resources (FHIR) standard [48]
and the Device Interoperability Middleware (DIM) used to bridge the gap be-
tween different healthcare vendors [49]. In addition, the PRISM model checker
has been utilized for the reliability/safety analysis of airbone applications by
augmenting it to the Matlab simulink [50], a RAID disk protocol used for read-
ing the data from the disk sectors [51], multi-processor systems based on the
Triple modular redundancy (TMR) model [52]. PRISM has also been utilized
for quantitative reliability and availability analysis of a satellite system [53].
Fault Trees The COMPASS tool [54] supports the formal FT analysis, specifi-
cally for aerospace systems. For verification purposes, COMPASS provides sup-
port of several model checking tools, like NuSMV [55] and MRMC [56]. This
tool provide various templates containing placeholders that have to be filled in
by the user. These templates are primarily composed of the most frequently used
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patterns that allow easy specifications of properties by non-experts by hiding the
details of the underlying temporal logic. The tool generates several outputs, such
as traces, FTs and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) tables, along with
diagnostic and performance measures.
Markov Chains Probabilistic model checking extends traditional model check-
ing principles for the analysis of MCs and allows the verification of probabilis-
tic properties. Probabilistic model checking techniques have been considerably
adopted to verify the reliability properties of many systems, such as NAND
multiplexing [57], an airbag system, an industrial process control system and
the Herschel-Planck satellite system [58]. In [59], the reliability analysis of the
Fast And Secure Protocol (FASP) is carried out by first defining the successful
data transmission using STL and then the communication network is modeled in
the form of a sender, receiver and a communication channel module in PRISM.
Finally, the reliability property is then verified against the communication net-
work using the PRISM model checker.
3.3 Higher-order-Logic Theorem Proving
Interactive theorem provers, like HOL4, Isabelle/HOL and Coq, can be used to
reason about probabilistic behaviors using the higher-order-logic formalizations
of probability theory [60,61,62]. This feature has been widely used to conduct
the dependability analysis of many systems. For instance, the probability theory
in HOL4 [61] has been used for the reliabililty analysis of combinational circuits
[63] and reconfigurable memory arrays [64]. In these work, however, the relia-
bility is evaluated based on probabilistic principles directly, i.e., no component
to system-level assessment based on RBD or FT methods is done. Similarly,
formally verified statistical properties of the continuous random variables have
been used to reason about the fundamental reliability properties, including sur-
vival function and hazard rate [65]. These reliability properties are then used to
analyzed the reliability of electronic system components [65].
Reliability Block Diagrams The higher-order logic theorem prover HOL4
has been recently used for the formalization of RBDs, including series [66], par-
allel [67], parallel-series [67] and series-parallel [68]. These formalizations have
been used for the reliability analysis of a simple oil and gas pipeline with serial
components [66], WSN protocols [67] and logistic supply chains [67].
Fault Trees A higher-order-logic formalization of generic Fault Tree gates, i.e.,
AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR and NOT and the formal verification of their
failure probability expressions have also been recently proposed in HOL4 [69].
In addition, this work also presents a formalization of probabilistic inclusion-
exclusion principle, which is then used to conduct the FT-based failure analysis
of a solar array used in a Dong Fang Hong-3 (DFH-3) satellite [69].
Markov Chains A foundational formalization of time-homogeneous DTMC
with finite state space has been presented in HOL4 [70] and Isabelle/HOL [71].
These formalizations have been successfully used to formally analyze a binary
communication channel [70], ZeroConf [71] and anonymizing crowds protocols
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[71]. None of these Markov chain formalizations has been used for reliability
analysis so far.
4 Comparison and Discussion
4.1 Comparison of Dependability Modeling Techniques
The criteria for the selection of these modeling techniques, for a certain system,
mainly depends upon the type of system and problem domain. A comparison
among these modeling techniques is shown in Table 3. For instance, RBD is
primarily used if we are interested in the successful working of the system while
FT models the failure relationship due to the failure of individual components
of the system. Also, both of these techniques utilize top-down analysis approach
that starts at the system level and then proceeds downward to link system per-
formance to failures at the component level. Due to this reason, these techniques
work only for combinatorial types of problems, where a combination of compo-
nents faults is used to determine the overall system failure. On the other hand,
Markov chains are more flexible in terms of handling a wide variety of problems,
as given in Table 3, including non-combinatorial problems, where systems are
in different operational modes, such as active or failed. However, Markov chains
fail to cater for large and complex systems due to the exponential growth in the
number of states.
Table 3: Comparison of Dependability Modeling Techniques
Features Reliability Block
Diagram
Fault
Tree
Markov
Chain
Success Domain X X
Failure Domain X X
Top-Down Approach X X X
Identification and Prevention of
Faults
X X X
Combinatorial Problems X X X
Non-combinatorial Problems X
Large and Complex Systems X X
Based on the survey conducted in Section 3, we have found that FTs have
been the mostly utilized dependability modeling technique by formal methods.
On the other hand, the utilization of RBD and MC models for the dependability
analysis is rapidly increasing specifically by PNs. The usage of RBD models with
model checking for the formal dependability analysis is an area that is almost
unexplored. We believe that this combination of modeling and analysis technique
has a huge potential for ensuring accurate reliability analysis of a wide variety
of safety-critical system.
4.2 Comparison of Dependability Analysis Techniques
A summary of various dependability analysis techniques is presented in Table
4. These techniques are evaluated according to their expressiveness, accuracy
and the possibility of automating the analysis. Model checking and Petri Nets
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are not expressive enough to model and verify all sorts of reliability properties
due to their state-based nature. The accuracy of the paper-and-pencil based
proofs is questionable because they are prone to human errors. Simulation is
inaccurate due to the involvement of pseudo-random number generators and
computer arithmetics along with its inherent sampling-based nature. Theorem
proving does not support all the reliability analysis foundations as of now. Fi-
nally, the paper-and-pencil based proof methods and interactive theorem proving
based analysis involve human guidance and therefore are not categorized as auto-
matic. However, there is some automatic verification support (e.g. [72]) available
for theorem proving, which can ease the human interaction in proofs and thus we
cannot consider interactive theorem proving as a completely manual approach.
All three formal methods techniques promise to provide accurate results and
thus can be very useful for analyzing the dependability aspects of safety and
financial-critical systems.
Table 4: Comparison of Reliability Analysis Techniques
Feature Paper-and-
pencil Proof
Simulation
Tools
Petri Nets Theorem
Proving
Model
Checking
Expressiveness X X X
Accuracy X (?) X X X
Automation X X X
We have used the question mark symbol in accuracy feature for paper-and-
pencil to highlight its limitation of being prone to human error.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed various dependability models constructed using
the building blocks offered by the formalisms of reliability block diagrams, fault
trees and Markov chains models. We have also presented a critical comparison,
of the various dependability analysis techniques, i.e., analytical methods, simu-
lation, and formal methods. Apart from providing the necessary background, we
have also provided a detailed survey of the application of formal methods avail-
able in the open literature focused on studying dependability analysis of various
real-world systems. The main contribution of this paper is that it is the first
work presenting a comprehensive review of the various dependability modeling
techniques in conjunction with formal methods along with a critical analysis
describing their pros and cons in various contexts. Existing surveys on depend-
ability analysis are either focused on software or communications networks and
do not cover formal methods in depth.
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